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This essay presents one doctrinal method for lawyers to
defend children accused of criminal charges in juvenile or
adult court: attacking the applicability of the nearly twenty-
year old case, New Jersey v. TL.O. to most school searches.
TL.O. established a lower standard for searches of students by
school officials, but it explicitly did not decide what standard
the government must meet to justify school searches per-
formed by police officers, creating a doctrinal starting point
for advocates to raise challenges to searches involving police.
More fundamentally, the TL. 0. Court based its decision on the
presumption that firm gates separate public school from law
enforcement and criminal justice institutions. Later adminis-
trative search cases inside and outside of the school context
show that the lower standard of TL.O. depends entirely on
programmatic purposes that distinguish school systems and
"ordinary law enforcement."
Porous schoolhouse gates have allowed schools and law
enforcement to become increasingly entangled. Police officers
are stationed full-time in our schools; states, localities and
school districts have set policies that require schools to turn
children over to law enforcement; states have criminalized
school-specific conduct; actions taken by schools can lead to
violations of a student's probation order from juvenile court;
and juvenile courts routinely share confidential information
with schools.
This excessive entanglement between schools and law
enforcement makes TL. 0. inapplicable in a school where such
entanglement exists. This conclusion would require the gov-
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emiment to choose: either it can search students using a lower
standard and prevent such searches from leading to law
enforcement action or it can guarantee students the same civil
rights in school that they have on the street. Either choice
would be a significant improvement of our current situation
where school searches deny children basic civil rights and
widen the net of the juvenile and adult criminal justice sys-
tems. This essay presents this argument, using specific facts
and cases from New York and South Carolina as examples.
This argument contrasts with the simplistic approach that sev-
eral state courts have applied when presented with this issue.
Lawyers for children should use the argument presented in this
essay to challenge the applicability of T.L.O. If they do, they
will win victories for their clients in some state and federal
courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 2003, school and law enforcement concern regard-
ing suspected drug activity led to a massive police search of Stratford
High School in the Berkeley School District, north of Charleston, South
Carolina.' According to police and school officials' statements to news
reporters, fourteen police officers assumed "strategic positions" inside
and outside the school. The officers, some with guns drawn, and a drug-
sniffing dog "secured" a hallway and the more than one hundred stu-
dents present there. The police ordered those students to get on their
knees and face the wall; the police handcuffed at least twelve students
who failed to do so immediately. Police officers physically searched stu-
dents and turned up no drugs. The dog alerted police to twelve bags car-
ried by various students. Searches of these bags also turned up no drugs.
This essay is concerned with the origins and legal implications of the
Stratford High search, which illustrate the issues raised by countless
other school searches. News agencies reported that the search arose after
close interaction between school and police agencies: A student
informed a school official about drug sales at school and a police inves-
1. All facts for this introductory example are based on news reports of the incident. See
CNN, Police, School District Defend Drug Raid (Nov. 10, 2003), at http://www.cnn.conV
2003/US/South/i 1/07/school.raid/index.html [hereinafter Police, School District]. While this
search may be severe enough to be labeled anomalous, the severity stems from its scope only. It
raises issues regarding the relationship between schools, crime, and law enforcement, particular-
ly how to appropriately regulate searches of students on school grounds, with far wider relevance.
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tigation soon began. While precise details remain unclear, it seems like-
ly that formal communication and cooperation between the school and
police department lead to this investigation.' The investigation included
analysis of school surveillance video,3 which made police suspect that
videotaped students were serving as drug lookouts. The school principal
saw these, and other surveillance tapes and was similarly suspicious.
The principal then asked the police to intervene, and the police quickly
arranged the drug raid.'
This essay asks the hypothetical question: If the raid had turned up
evidence of drug dealing on a student, such as a bag of marijuana, would
that evidence be admissible in a criminal or delinquency proceeding?
What standard should apply-the standard probable cause requirement
for police raids or the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard typically
applied to school searches?5 Does it matter that police planned and exe-
cuted the search? Does it matter if the police investigation stemmed
from an independent police investigation or, as seems more likely,
2. The local police department, under agreement with the school district, stations two police
officers full time at the high school in question. City of Goose Creek Police Dep't, Special
Operations Div., Sch. Res. Officers, at http://www.cityofgoosecreek.com/cities/GooseCreekSC/
docs/UploadedPages/specialops.htm (last visited May 30, 2004). Additionally, state law and
school district policy requires school officials to share evidence of a wide range of criminal activ-
ity with the police department. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
3. The school has seventy surveillance cameras. Marianne D. Hurst, Drug Sweep Sparks
Lawsuits, Investigations, EDuc. WEEK, Jan. 7 ,2004, at 3.
4. It is unclear why school officials did not intervene only with suspected students. One
speculation is that they were unable to identify individual students based on the videotape evi-
dence and elected to perform the raid rather than investigate further.
5. Even applying the "reasonable suspicion" standard, the severity of this search might pre-
vent the admissibility of any evidence. In particular, the defense would attack the search as not
"reasonably related to the objectives of the search" and "excessively intrusive." New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). This point drew immediate attention from advocates, includ-
ing the American Civil Liberties Union. See National Briefingi ISouth: South Carolina: Police
Draw Guns in School Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2003, at All (quoting Graham Boyd, director of
ACLU's Drug Policy Litigation Project, as challenging the use of guns in raid and suggesting
school should have called suspected students to principal's office instead). The severity of the
search, while the focus of news reports of the search, see Police, School District Defend Drug
Raid, supra note 1, is not the focus on my analysis. It is similarly the focus of an ACLU lawsuit
filed on Dec. 15, 2003, in U.S. District Court in Charleston, South Carolina. The twenty plain-
tiffs-Stratford students and their families-in Alexander v. Goose Creek allege that police and
school officials arranged the raid without reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct by students
involved and used unreasonable and excessive force, in addition to state law tort claims. See
Complaint, Alexander et al. v. Goose Creek Police Dep't, at http://www.aclu.org/DrugPolicy/
DrugPolicy.cfm?ID=14578&c=19 (last visited May 31, 2004).
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through collaboration with the school?6 Does it matter that they did so at
the request of the school principal? Does it matter whether that request
represented a one-time use of law enforcement at the school or part of a
wider policy tying school, police, and prosecutor in a close and ongoing
relationship? Does it matter if the police intended to arrest those they
found with drugs,7 or if they merely intended to confiscate any drugs and
drug paraphernalia and turn the offending student over to school offi-
cials for school disciplinary action? While these questions have specific
doctrinal implications, they also speak to broader issues regarding the
role of police in schools, how we balance school security with legal pro-
tections for children, and whether and how to limit juvenile courts'
involvement with children.
This essay's exploration of these questions leads to the conclusion that
the increasingly complex relationship between schools and law enforce-
ment requires revision to the doctrine first announced by the Supreme
Court nearly twenty years ago in New Jersey v. TL.0.8 that applies a
lower level of scrutiny to school searches than to typical searches.
Developments since 1985-when the Court decided TL.O.-undermine
a basic assumption of that decision, specifically that schools and law
enforcement are fundamentally separate institutions.9 Increased use of
police in schools, formalized school and state policies requiring routine
information sharing from schools to courts, and other developments
require a reexamination of TL.0.
TL.O., like other Supreme Court cases examining the constitutional
rights of children in schools, presumes that firm boundaries separate
schools and the rest of society, thus allowing distinct constitutional rules
to apply. One of the most frequently cited lines from Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District envisions schools surrounded by
firm gates.' ° The legal question becomes what rights remain when chil-
dren are inside those gates.
6. See supra note 2.
7. This intent is not explicit in any news reports, but seems likely given the severity of the
search.
8. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
9. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
10. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."). This line is frequently cited for the proposition that chil-
dren at school do not shed constitutional rights generally-not only the First Amendment rights
at issue in Tinker. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
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Schoolhouse gates, contrary to the Court's assumptions in Tinker and
subsequent cases, have become porous," especially in the realm of
school discipline and security. Stronger connections now exist between
school disciplinary systems and juvenile and adult criminal courts.
These developments not only challenge a central metaphor of Supreme
Court case law generally, but they demand a reappraisal of cases that
make it relatively easy for school officials to search students. The "spe-
cial needs" doctrine developed by the Court is premised in large part on
firm gates between schools and law enforcement, limiting the impact of
most searches to the school context. This essay argues that recent
changes in security and discipline practices in public schools require
modifications to the "special needs" doctrine regarding searches,
seizures and related due process issues in schools and it presents an
argument that lawyers for children in juvenile or adult criminal court
proceedings may use to challenge that doctrine.
Part II describes how TL.O. envisioned schools separate from law
enforcement. It then presents the basic framework of Fourth Amendment
"special needs" doctrine-which first asks whether a particular search
policy has a justification beyond "ordinary law enforcement" and, if so,
whether the resulting search is reasonable considering the goals at issue-
and how this doctrine frames the analysis of school searches. Part III uses
New York City schools and the recent Stratford High School raid as
examples to describe recent changes in the role of police officers within
public schools and with school districts' policies regarding when a school
search leads to law enforcement action. This Part shows how porous
boundaries between schools and juvenile courts have become. Part IV
reviews several state court decisions that address these issues-typically
536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) ("[S]choolchildren do not shed their constitutional rights when they
enter the schoolhouse .... "), citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995), citing same; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988), citing same; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986), citing same;
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring), citing same; Bd. of Educ.,
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982), citing same.
11. Martha Minow has noted that many borders relating to schools have become "up for
grabs" in recent years. See Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between
Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061,
1062 (2000). Professor Minow, while focusing on the porous borders in the three categories in
her title rather than those between schools and law enforcement, understands the psychological
appeal to justices of strict borders and the need to reevaluate doctrine when those borders no
longer hold. See id. at 1061 ("[L]awyers care so much about boundaries and borders-which we
then continually cross and divide.").
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without consideration of issues identified by the Supreme Court's special
needs jurisprudence.'2 Part IV then applies the "special needs" test to this
new reality of porous school-court boundaries and argues that the defer-
ential standard applied by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. TL. 0. is no
longer tenable.'3 While this conclusion immediately seeks to stem the net-
widening effects of funneling misbehaving students from schools to the
juvenile court, it also seeks to reevaluate how federal courts conceive of
schools. This conclusion implies that the jurisprudential metaphor of
schoolhouse gates wholly separating schools from society fails to capture
the complexity of schools' structure or purpose.
II. BASIS OF SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE: PROGRAMMATIC
PURPOSE MUST BE DISTINCT FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT
A. New Jersey v. T.L.O. : Reasonable Suspicion Standard for School
Searches, but Unanswered Questions for Modern Day Schools
In New Jersey v. TL. 0., the Supreme Court held that "the substantial
interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the
12. While this essay addresses interpretation of federal constitutional law, state courts could
adopt the framework laid out here under federal or state constitutional theories. State theories
could be especially important if federal courts upheld TL.O. Cf Nina Morrison, Curing
"Constitutional Amnesia": Criminal Procedure Under State Constitutions, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
880 (1998) (describing state cases extending state protections beyond reigning federal interpre-
tations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law).
13. Others have argued that police searches of students should be held to probable cause
standards, but they have done so for reasons of legal clarity, rather than out of a consideration of
widespread dissolution of school-law enforcement boundaries. See Jacqueline A. Stefkovich &
Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?,
1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 67 (1999) ("Considering the ambiguity involved in the relationships
between school officials and the police .... the solution to this problem seems to lie in crafting
uniform standards. In other words, if police are involved in school searches, then they should be
subject to the same standards that police normally use."). Stefkovich and Miller's analysis also
fails to consider the impact of administrative search cases beyond the school setting. See also
Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARiz. L. REv.
1067 (2003). Pinard argues, as this essay does, that school-law enforcement entanglement calls
for application of a probable cause standard to many school searches. While a valuable contri-
bution, Pinard's article does not provide an in depth analysis of the administrative search cases
that form the doctrinal core of the argument. Id. at 1099-1101. Nor does Pinard discuss how
administrative search principles informed TL.O., a discussion included in Part II.A of this essay.
This leads Pinard to a different proposed solution than this essay, one with less doctrinal or pol-
icy support. See infra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
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classroom and on school grounds"'' 4 justified a less demanding standard
for searches of public school students by school officials. In particular,
the Court unanimously held that school officials need not obtain a war-
rant before searching a student because such a requirement would pre-
vent "the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools."' 5 Further, the Court announced a reasonable sus-
picion standard for searches of students by school officials, and held that
suspicion of school rules infractions-not only suspicion of illegal activ-
ity-could justify searches.16
Two points from TL.O. bear emphasis here. First, the Court left unan-
swered key questions regarding modem school security practice. The
TL.O. Court did not consider some factors that have become more preva-
lent today, nearly twenty years after the Court's holding, leaving open the
possibility for lawyers for children to press the argument presented in this
essay. The Court explicitly avoided consideration of the proper standard
for school searches involving police officers. 7 Further, the Court did not
consider the effect of school policies requiring notification of law
enforcement officials of evidence of criminal activities. When reciting
14. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339.
15. Id. at 340. While the Court was otherwise split six votes to three, even dissenting justices
agreed that warrants were not required. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A teacher or prin-
cipal could neither carry out essential teaching functions nor adequately protect students safety if
required to wait for a warrant before conducting a necessary search."); id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (finding "warrantless searches of students by school administrators ... reasonable when
undertaken for those purposes"-responding to "violent, unlawful or seriously disruptive con-
duct"). This essay does not address the warrant exception for school searches, instead focusing on
the bar school officials or police officers must meet before searching a student-probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Under alternative "special needs" tests proposed by scholars, one could sep-
arate the warrant requirement from probable cause requirement. Jonathan Kravis, applying an
"administrative question" test, argued that the administrative burden school officials would face if
required to obtain a warrant requirement, should call for an exception, regardless of the primary
purpose of a school search. Jonathan Kravis, A Better Interpretation of "Special Needs" Doctrine
After Edmond and Ferguson, 112 YALE L.J. 2590 (2003).
16. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 at 341-42 (finding search justified when reasonable suspicion exists
"that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school") (emphasis
added).
17. See id. at 341 n.7 ("This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard
for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the
behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question."). As it is today,
the proper standard for searches involving police at schools was a contentious issue. The TL.O.
Court listed state and federal court decisions regarding school searches including three cases that
"held or suggested" that probable cause is the appropriate standard for such searches. Id. at 332
n.2. The Court also cited cases holding that no constitutional barriers limited school searches and
those which sought a middle ground. Id.
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the facts of the search at issue, the Court merely notes that the assistant
principal "turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police,"' 8 with-
out noting whether this action was compelled or encouraged by school
policy or determined by the assistant principal in his unfettered personal
or professional discretion as a tutor of children. This issue becomes more
pressing when one reads Justice Powell's concurrence, which represents
the views of two of the six justices who announced the reasonable suspi-
cion standard-his and Justice O'Connor's. Powell based his opinion, in
part, on the notion that school officials have no "obligation to be familiar
with the criminal laws" and instead should focus on teaching.'9 School
policies, discussed below in Part III.B, that require school officials to
inform law enforcement of any evidence of crime and thus impose an
obligation of familiarity with criminal law on school officials, might
force these concurring justices to reevaluate their votes.
Second, TL.O. hints at a conception of schools as fundamentally sepa-
rate from wider society, especially law enforcement systems. The Court
spoke at length about the "flexibility" required by the necessity of "main-
taining security and order in the schools."2 Thus, while the majority
avoided a thorough discussion comparing this purpose to ordinary law
enforcement goals,2' its holding seems grounded in the Court's conception
of schools' interest in discipline within its walls as distinct from broader
social interests in law and order. The concurrences make this point clear.22
18. Id. at 328. This action led to a police request that T.L.O.'s mother bring her to the police
station, which led to T.L.O.'s confession. Using both that confession and the evidence discovered
by the assistant principal's search, T.L.O. was adjudged a delinquent and received a disposition
of one year probation. Id. at 329-30. Interestingly, Justice White for the majority used the stan-
dard terminology of adult criminal procedure, writing that the juvenile court "sentenced" T.L.O.,
id. at 330, rather than the more typical juvenile court terminology of "disposition." See, e.g., In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1966) (noting that "unique" requirements of juvenile "post-adju-
dication disposition" separated that inquiry from process required during a juvenile delinquency
trial). Perhaps Justice White's terminology indicates his understanding of the severity of the con-
sequences faced by children in the juvenile court system.
19. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 350 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 340.
21. Such a discussion forms the typical analysis of "special needs" searches. The doctrine
underlying such searches is discussed in Part II.B.
22. The concurrences are decisive both because they add this logically crucial element to the
majority's analysis and because three of the six justices in the majority wrote or signed concur-
rences, making their reasoning indispensable to the holding. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 326 (noting that
Justices White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor signed onto the opinion of the Court, but
Justices Powell and O'Connor concurred in a separate opinion, as did Justice Blackmun).
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Justice Powell first cited Tinker's schoolhouse gates metaphor23 and used
that to draw a sharp distinction between the school setting and law
enforcement purposes: "The special relationship between teacher and stu-
dent also distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate.
Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects...
. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school
authorities and pupils." 24 Regardless of the accuracy of Powell's statement
in 1985,25 subsequent changes that blur the line between school officials
and law enforcement-changes that open the gates between schools and
the rest of society-would undermine the holding in TL.O. 26 This essay
discusses such changes in Part III below.
B. Under Recent Supreme Court Special Needs Case Law, Schools may not
Justify the Reasonable Suspicion Standard without an Analysis Showing its
Policy's Principle Purpose to be Separate from General Law Enforcement
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,27 the Supreme Court voided a police
department's traffic checkpoint program because it called for searches
with neither individualized suspicion nor a special need sufficiently sep-
arate from typical crime prevention. Rather than pursuing a goal such as
border security or traffic safety, the police program sought solely to catch
individuals possessing, transporting, and selling narcotics. Thus, the
Supreme Court decided to "draw[] the line at roadblocks designed pri-
marily to serve the general interest in crime control." 28
23. Id. at 348.
24. Id. at 349-50.
25. T.L.O., the fourteen year old ninth grader, would not likely characterize her relationship
with the assistant principal who searched her purse, suspended her from school, and turned her
over to the police as a nonadversarial one.
26. Justice Blackmun's concurrence applied different terminology but similar logic. He
agreed with the reasonable suspicion standard because "special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement" make typical Fourth Amendment search and seizure requirements "imprac-
ticable." Id. at 351. Framing the problem in this manner invites questions regarding whether "spe-
cial needs" or typical law enforcement needs motivate a particular school search.
27. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). The Supreme Court has granted cert to another special needs case
that depends heavily on how the Court will apply Edmond. In Illinois v. Ledster, 779 N.E.2d 855
(Ill. 2002), cert granted, 123 S.Ct. 1928 (2003), the Illinois Supreme Court applied Edmond to
prevent Illinois police from setting up a road block to gather information from potential witness-
es to a past crime. The issue on review is whether that purpose is "designed primarily to serve
the general interest in crime control." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
28. Id. at 42.
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Edmond explicitly calls for inquiries into programmatic purposes,
underscoring at several points its emphasis on the primary purpose of the
state's policy. "We are particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to
the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental author-
ities primarily pursue their general crime control ends."29 Edmond builds
off of Delaware v. Prouse,0 which noted that state interests "not distin-
guishable from the general interest in crime control,"'" were insufficient
to justify exceptions to individualized suspicion requirements.
When the state seeks an administrative search exception from stan-
dard probable cause and warrant requirements, the state opens itself to
an analysis of its programmatic purposes, not the intent of individual
actors.32 Edmond cautions "that the purpose inquiry in this context is to
be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to
probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene."33 Thus,
applied to school searches, Edmond instructs courts to examine statutes,
regulations, school board policies and routine school practice to deter-
mine the purpose behind a particular search. The inquiry should avoid
what an individual police officer is thinking when interrogating or
searching a student at a high school, but should consider what the police
department or the school was thinking when it set a policy of inviting
police officers into schools or of sharing student disciplinary informa-
tion with the juvenile court.
Even more recently, the Supreme Court struck down the City of
Charleston's program requiring drug testing of pregnant women because
its purpose and implementation involved "excessive entanglement" with
law enforcement.34 Charleston's policy applied to women who met any
of a set of factors raising some suspicion that they would have a drug
addiction.35 The city then tested all such women in a manner designed to
29. Id. at 43.
30. 440 U.S. 648 (1979), cited in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
31. Id. at 659 n.18.
32. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 ("[W]hile subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis, programmatic purposes may be relevant to [admin-
istrative searches]. Accordingly, [probable cause doctrine] does not preclude an inquiry into pro-
grammatic purpose.").
33. Id. at 48.
34. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.20 (2001).
35. Id. at 71 (listing nine medical factors, any of which would trigger the city's policy).
While triggering the policy required individual action that triggered suspicion, no reviewing
court considered these factors to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, let alone probable
cause. Id. at 76.
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preserve such evidence for use in a criminal trial. 6 A positive drug test
after labor led immediately to arrest; during pregnancy, arrest immedi-
ately followed after a second positive test or a missed appointment with
a substance abuse program.37 The Court saw through the city's purport-
ed public health and safety rationale and found that the purpose of the
searches was to gather evidence for law enforcement purposes. Thus, the
city could not shield its program with the special needs doctrine.38
The Ferguson Court's reliance on the law enforcement overtones of
Charleston's program is relevant to school searches in several ways.
First, close integration of law enforcement in effectuating the policy
increases the invasion of privacy. Second, designing the policy in order
to provide and preserve evidence on a routine basis for law enforcement
use may be evidence that the purpose of the search is for law enforce-
ment.39 Third, having public health and safety purposes in addition to
law enforcement purposes are not sufficient to qualify a program as a
"special needs case." The Court noted that although the city "may well
have" had a goal of ending drug use by pregnant women, the means used
indicated an overriding law enforcement purpose."
Scholars analyzing recent special needs cases have similarly conclud-
ed that the fundamental issue is "the primary purpose to which the gov-
ernment intended to put the results of the search," distinguishing those
searches "that did not involve arrest and prosecution."'" An analysis of
recent school drug test cases bolsters the conclusion that lower scrutiny
applied to school searches depends on its separation from criminal or
juvenile court sanctions. Even though those cases increased state power
at the expense of children's privacy, the Supreme Court's reasoning is
based on schools' refusal to allow information discovered in drug tests
36. The policy required hospital staff to follow a chain of custody with urine samples "pre-
sumably to make sure that the results could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings." Id. at
71-72.
37. Id. at 72.
38. Id. at 83.
39. See id. at 79 n.15 (suggesting that "routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence
obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give right to an inference of pretext) (quot-
ing Skinner v. R. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989).
40. Id. at 82-83.
41. Kravis, supra note 15, at 2593.
July 2004]
302 Journal of Law & Education
to lead to law enforcement consequences. This point bears special
emphasis because state courts do not always recognize it.42
In Board of Education of Independent School District Number 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls,3 the Court upheld the school district's pol-
icy of suspicionless drug testing of all middle and high school students
participating in extracurricular activities, but repeatedly noted that the
policy did not lead to any law enforcement consequences." The Court
concluded that the "character of the intrusion imposed by the Policy"45
was "not significant"46 in large part because of the consequences attached
to failing a drug test. Most important, testing positive did not lead to
criminal or delinquency charges because the school did not share data
with law enforcement.47 This conclusion built on similar reasoning in an
earlier school drug test case, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.48
There, the Court upheld a school policy requiring suspicionless drug test-
ing of all student athletes in which the school limited consequences of
positive test results to suspension from interscholastic sports activity.
49
The school convinced the Court that the policy's "distinctly nonpunitive"
purpose distinguished it from searches designed to produce evidence for
court proceedings. 0 The Court relied on strict separation between the
drug testing policy and any criminal or delinquency-related conse-
42. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 708 A.2d 350, 356 (Pa. 1998) (discussing Acton but
failing to note, as Acton Court did, that drug test results were not turned over to law enforcement,
which distinguished Acton from the criminal case at bar).
43. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). In the eighteen months since the Supreme Court announced Earls,
much has been written criticizing it. See, e.g., Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights:
A Critical Examination of Students' Privacy Rights and the "Special Needs" Doctrine After
Earls, 3 NEV. L.J. 411 (2002/2003). Without detracting from those criticisms, this essay recog-
nizes Earls's binding authority and applies it accordingly.
44. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 ("[T]he School District's Policy is not in any way related to the
conduct of criminal investigations .... "); id. at 833-34 (noting that "test results are not turned
over to any law enforcement authority" and school disciplinary sanctions are limited to the abil-
ity to participate in extracurricular activities and only when student tests positive three times).
45. Id. at 832.
46. Id. at 834.
47. Id. at 833. The Court, by noting the limited disciplinary implications even within
schools, supra note 44, implied that the degree of school disciplinary sanctions that attach to such
policies affect their constitutionality. A suspicionless drug testing program that, for instance, sus-
pended students who tested positive for a significant amount of time would thus face some con-
stitutional doubts.
48. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
49. See id. at 651 (describing operation of school drug test policy).
50. Id. at 658 n.2.
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quences.5' Similarly, what academic support for school drug testing that
exists has relied upon a "treatment-oriented model" rather than a more
punitive program. 2
Ferguson indicates the decisive importance of the strict separation
between public health or safety policies and law enforcement uses.
Sharing information from a search with third parties-such as police or
the juvenile court-increases the state's invasion of citizens' privacy.
The Court reached this conclusion using language that explicitly evoked
the separation that was decisive in Earls: "The use of an adverse test
result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a
promotion or an opportunity to participate in an extracurricular activi-
ty, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized dis-
semination of such results to third parties."53 The Ferguson Court con-
sidered whether the state turned information over to law enforcement as
strongly indicative of whether the "special need" was "one divorced
from the State's general interest in law enforcement," noting that the
Court relied on limits on the disclosure of drug test results in Vernonia
to distinguish the school's purpose.'
These recent cases focus on suspicionless searches, which differ tech-
nically from the search at issue in TL. 0. and many school searches and
disciplinary actions, which generally have some level of individualized
suspicion that falls short of probable cause. They are relevant to TL.O.
for two primary reasons. First, the cases all relate to administrative
searches, where the threshold question relates to the search's primary
purpose. Second, Edmond implies that suspicionless search cases apply
51. See id. at 658 ("[T]he results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school
personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities
or used for any internal disciplinary function.").
52. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs & Boaz S. Morag, The Curious Rejection of Drug Testing by
America's Schools, 94 TEACHERS COLLEGE REcoRD 208, 208, 221 (1992) (arguing for the legali-
ty of universal student drug tests "especially if there is nothing more punitive at stake than coun-
seling, special education, and treatment").
53. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). In Vernonia, failing a drug test resulted in
barring the student from participating in school athletics. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651 (noting that
students who tested positive for drug use had the choice of participating in a drug treatment pro-
gram or facing suspension from athletic teams). In Earls, decided the year after Ferguson, failing
a drug test resulted in denying the student the ability to participate in any extracurricular program.
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833
(2002) ("the only consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of partici-
pating in extracurricular activities").
54. See id. at 79-80, n.16.
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to TL.O. The Edmond Court, addressing a suspicionless roadblock pro-
gram, relied on TL.O. for the proposition that a "search must be reason-
ably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place."5 The flip side of this conclusion is that the
Supreme Court would apply its rule barring probable cause exceptions
for suspicionless searches for the general purpose of law enforcement to
prevent similar probable cause exceptions where some individualized
suspicion exists if the primary purpose is general law enforcement rather
than school discipline. Earls and Vernonia similarly speak to TL.O.'s
continuing applicability. Both rely on TL. O.'s concern with not interfer-
ing with the "swift and informal disciplinary procedures." 6 These cita-
tions-and the separation of the drug test policies at issue from court
sanctions discussed above-lead to the inference that the Supreme Court
continues to view the special needs doctrine as dependent on school dis-
ciplinary interests distinct from police and court involvement, whether
the school searches spring from individualized suspicion as in TL.O. or
suspicionless searches as in Earls and Vernonia.
III. SCHOOL SECURITY AND DISCIPLINE POLICIES HAVE
EVOLVED TO FEATURE CLOSER CONNECTIONS TO JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE THAN ENVISIONED BY TL.O.
America's public schools look far different today that they did when
the Supreme Court decided TL.O. In particular, schools address disci-
pline and security issues far differently now than in 1985. This Part dis-
cusses post-TL.O. developments that indicate significant roles of law
enforcement officials in day-to-day school security and routine cooper-
ation between school officials and law enforcement that is often
informed by state laws and official school district policy. Those devel-
opments, which this Part addresses in turn, include the increased pres-
ence of police officers in schools, official state and school policies
requiring schools to share information related to potential crimes with
police departments, state laws criminalizing particular behavior at
schools, the role school infractions can have in sparking a contempt
finding of a child on probation with the juvenile court, and the sharing
55. 531 U.S. 32, 47 n.2 (2000).
56. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985), cited in Earls, 536 U.S. at 828-29,
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
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of confidential information regarding juvenile court proceedings with
schools officials. Finally, this Part responds to the argument that severe
problems with crime and security in schools demand constitutional flex-
ibility; this concern only underlines the need to treat school security like
any other state program designed to further general law enforcement
goals.
A. Increasing Use of Police Officers in Schools
TL.O. explicitly reserved judgment on the standard properly applied
to school searches involving police officers. 7 Courts can no longer
ignore this question as police officers have become regular fixtures in
many schools.
New York City schools turned to the New York Police Department
(NYPD) to improve security in schools. At the beginning of the 1998-
1999 school year, the New York City Board of Education voted to trans-
fer control of all school security officers to the NYPD.58 Under the plan,
the NYPD would recruit, train and manage 3,200 officers. Armed offi-
cers would focus their attention on 128 of the city's more than 1,100
schools.59 More recently, New York City created a task force of 150 to
focus entirely on twelve of the city's most violent schools,' a decision
that quickly led to multiple arrests of teenagers.6'
With 1.1 million students and national attention, New York City's
decision is momentous in and of itself. But New York is not alone in
making these changes. Case law discussed in Part IV.A shows that
Illinois schools-both inside and outside of Chicago-have regular
police presence. While this essay focuses on large urban school districts,
especially New York City, one would be mistaken to dismiss these
examples as anomalies. The federal government has provided funds for
school districts to hire police and install security guards at least since the
57. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
58. Lynette Holloway, Board Votes to Give Police Control over School Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1998, at B5.
59. Randal C. Archibold, New Era as Police Prepare to Run School Security, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1998, at B1.
60. Elissa Gootman, Police to Guard 12 City Schools Cites as Wolent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2004, at Al.
61. The day after Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg announced the creation of the task force,
the police arrested six students, none on charges more serious than assault. Elissa Gootman, Six
Students Arrested in City Crackdown on Violent Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2004, at B3.
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Safe Schools Act of 1994.62 By 1994, more than 2000 school police offi-
cers were on the hallway, cafeteria, and classroom beat across the coun-
try.63 More recently, the federal Department of Justice Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program has spent $700 million dol-
lars to help localities hire, train, and equip school police officers through
its "Secure Our Schools" program."M These grants have funded school
police officers in communities large and small.6" The Department of
Education has reported that, while schools with high crime rates are
most likely to have a significant police presence, more than twenty per-
cent of schools only reporting "moderate" or "isolated" crime also
reported having a significant police presence.66
The Stratford raid also displays the increased role of police enforcing
laws in South Carolina public schools. Beyond the obvious police role
in designing and implementing the raid in question, the local police
department stations two police officers at the school full-time.67 As the
Stratford High School principal himself noted, the mere presence of
police at school matters significantly: "[O]nce police are on campus,
they are in charge."6 Many courts have tried to distinguish cases where
police initiate searches from cases where police merely carry out search-
es as directed by the school officials.69 However, if we take Principal
McCrackin's comment at face value, this distinction makes little sense;
62. Stefkovich & Miller, supra note 13 at 32.
63. Jessica Portner, Cops on Campus, EDUC. WEEK, June 22, 1994 at 30.
64. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, COPS Office Announces $4.9 Million to Increase
School Safely in 27 States, at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=958 (last visited May
30, 2004) (announcing $4.9 million in new grants and noting that COPS has spent a total of $700
million for 6,100 school police officers).
65. See Dep't of Justice Off. of Community Oriented Policing Services, Secure Our School's
Grantees, (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/
open.pdf?Item=957 (last visited May 30, 2004) (listing "Securing Our School" grantees as of
Oct. 1, 2003). The most recent set of grantees include localities in twenty-six states, including
Othello, Virginia; El Paso, Texas; Cleveland, Ohio; Holyoke, Mass.; and North Pole, Alaska. Id.
66. The Department reported that 22.5% of schools with "isolated crime" had at least one
police officer on campus thirty or more hours per week, compared with 24.4% of schools with
"moderate crime" and 33.1% of schools with "violent crime." PLANNING AND EVALUATION
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL CRIME PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF
U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE, Doc. #2001-37, at 20
(2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/school-improvement.html#3-reports
[hereinafter A National Profile].
67. City of Goose Creek Police Dep't., supra note 2.
68. Tamar Lewin, Raid at High School Leads to Racial Divide, Not Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2003 (quoting Nov. 11 letter from principal George McCrackin to Stratford High School parents).
69. See infra Part IV.A.
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any search involving a police officer is fundamentally different from
other school searches.
B. Official State and School Policies Require Routine Connections
between Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies
Both Edmond 70 and Ferguson instruct lower courts to analyze the
intent of a search on a programmatic level, looking at routine practice as
indicative of such intent.7' State and school district statutes and regula-
tions set official policy and govern routine actions and are thus highly
probative of whether modern school searches are motivated by general
law enforcement concerns. And such official policies indicate routine
connections between schools and law enforcement agencies, indicating
both a general law enforcement purpose and greater degree of intrusive-
ness of resulting searches.
Not only have police officers established a regular presence in
American schools, but state legislation and local school district policy
have regularized contact between schools and law enforcement. Turning
school disciplinary incidents into criminal investigations and, eventual-
ly, delinquency or criminal charges is now a matter of formal policy and
regular routine. An analysis of New York City school regulations and
South Carolina and Stratford High School statutes and regulations dis-
plays how these formal policies have changed the post-TL.O. world of
school security and law enforcement.
The New York City school system revised its "Security in the Schools"
regulation in 2000 explicitly because of the presence of police officers in
schools.72 First, the new regulation sees no distinction between the work
of school police officers and other school officials, noting that school
security is the "collective responsibility" of school officials and police
officers who "shall consult and work cooperatively . . . on matters per-
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
71. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15 (suggesting that "routine use
in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give
right to an inference of pretext) (quoting Skinner v. R. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
621 n.5 (1989).
72. N.Y. CITY BD. OF EDUC., SECURITY IN THE SCHOOLS, REGULATION OF THE CHANCELLOR,
SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO A-412, available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-
523/RegTOC.html (last visited May 30, 2004) ("The merger between the Board and the NYPD
necessitated many of the changes contained in this regulation.").
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taining to school security." 73 This cooperation requires school officials to
inform police officers of any "school-related crime," whether or not it
represents an "immediate safety emergency. 74 The regulation does not
define the term "school-related crime," but it does require police notifi-
cation "in all cases" when a school official receives "information or an
allegation" of a crime.75 Thus, by district policy applicable in all New
York City public schools, low-level suspicion of a low-level crime nec-
essarily leads to police involvement. This expanded mandatory police
involvement also revises the school system's search and seizure policy;
now, the search and seizure policy statement refers to the new "Security
in the Schools" policy, noting that school officials "must" involve police
officers whenever illegal contraband is found in a student's possession.76
It is worth noting that, despite this change, the school did not revise the
standard applied to any school search, which is modeled directly on
TL. 0.77 The policy statements indicate no consideration that post-TL. 0.
changes might change that standard.
Some regulations even require school officials to follow procedures
that would enable prosecutors to establish a chain of custody for seized
contraband-such as drugs or weapons-and use such contraband as
evidence in a criminal proceeding. For instance, a New York City
Chancellor's Regulation requires school officials to seal any contraband
in an envelope, complete a voucher form, and turn the envelope over to
the New York Police Department.7" This evokes the precise concern
73. N.Y CITY BD. OF EDUC., SECURITY IN THE SCHOOLS, REGULATION OF THE CHANCELLOR A-
412, at 1, available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-523/RegTOC.html (last visit-
ed May 30, 2004).
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id.
76. N.Y. CITY BD. OF EDUC., REGULATION OF THE CHANCELLOR A-432, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
at 7, available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-523/RegTOC.html (last visited
May 30, 2004) ("Where a student is found to be in possession of illegal contraband, the appro-
priate procedures must be followed for notification of the police and arrest of the student."), cit-
ing Chancellor's Regulation A-412.
77. The policy's standard reads:
A student's person and possessions may be searched provided that school officials have
reasonable suspicion to believe that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law and/or school rules and regulations. The
extent and scope of the search must be reasonably related to the objective of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and nature of the
infraction.
Id. at 1. This provision closely tracks the language in TL. 0. itself. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341-42 (1985).
78. N.Y. CITY BD. OF EDUC., supra note 76, at 9.
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voiced by the Supreme Court in Ferguson-that following such proce-
dures indicates that the purpose of gathering such evidence is for gener-
al law enforcement purposes rather than health and safety of individuals
at school.79 If the school was only concerned with health and safety, it
could simply dispose of the contraband. However, it's policy of preserv-
ing evidence for courtroom use indicates a different purpose.
The Stratford raid also displays the increased coordination between
police and schools. Beyond the full-presence of two police officers at the
school,8" South Carolina law, like New York City regulations, conflates
the jobs of police officers and school officials. State law defines the duty
of school police as "act[ing] as a law enforcement officer, advisor, and
teacher."8' Regardless of their job description, these police officers must
be involved whenever a school crime is suspected; state law requires
school officials who suspect criminal activity to report this suspicion to
the police. 2 The South Carolina Legislature enacted this statute in 1990,
five years after TL.O. 83 The following year, the Berkeley School
District, which includes Stratford High School, implemented the policy
by requiring school administrators to contact law enforcement on
"notice" of a broad list of crimes, including assault (without specifying
how severe an assault must be), threat of assault to school officials, pos-
session of dangerous weapons, and possession of controlled sub-
79. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
80. City of Goose Creek Police Dep't, supra note 2.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-12(B) (West 2003).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (West 2003) ("[S]chool administrators must contact law
enforcement authorities immediately upon notice that a person is engaging or has engaged in activ-
ities on school property ... which may result or results in injury or serious threat of injury to the
person or to another person or his property as defined in local board policy."). The statute does not
define the term "notice," so it remains unclear what level of suspicion triggers this reporting
requirement. The legislature appears to direct school officials to err on the side of reporting a sus-
pected crime; the legislature passed a law holding school administrators and their school districts
civilly liable for failure to comply with the School Crime Report Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-
335 (West 2003) ("Failure of a school administrator to report criminal conduct.., shall subject
the administrator and the school district to liability for payment of a party's attorney's fees and the
costs associated with an action to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the administrator and school
district to comply ....").
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (West 2003).
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stances.' Thus, as a matter of policy, Stratford High School and the local
police department are linked.85
C. Criminalization of Particular Cconduct at School
Requiring school officials to report suspicion of any criminal activity
to police leads to even more intrusive invasions of privacy when coupled
with the criminalization of additional conduct at school and increased
penalties for crimes committed at school. In 2000, the New York legis-
lature added a new charge to second degree assault: "Acting ...on
school grounds and with intent to cause physical injury, he or she: (a)
causes such injury to an employee of a school or public school district. '1 6
By drawing attention to any assaults on school grounds, however minor,
and by requiring school officials to report suspicion of any crime, 7 these
laws increase the probability that any schoolyard fight could turn into a
delinquency or criminal action and increase the severity of any disposi-
tions or sentences that result, both of which relate to the level of intru-
84. BERKELEY SCH. DIsT., POLICY RELATIONS WITH POLICE DEPARTMENTINTERROGATIONS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, at http://209.125.230.134/cgi-bin/om-isapi.dll?clientlD=6020466&adv-
query=%2259-24-60%22&depth=2&headingswithhits=on&hitsperheading=on&infobase=
berkeley.nfo&record= { 37251 &softpage=PLframe.
85. It seems likely that these broad links led to the Stratford raid. It is now clear that at least
some links were involved: the Stratford High School principal, George McCrackin, invited the
police to raid the school. Lewin, supra note 68.
86. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(10) (Gould 2001). This is a Class D felony. Id. Previously, this
would have been third degree assault. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (Gould 2001) ("A person is
guilty of assault in the third degree when: 1. With intent to cause physical injury to another per-
son, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person."). This is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id. This distinction is particularly important in New York. Juvenile court jurisdiction ends when a
child turns sixteen years old. See N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 302.1 (McKinney 2003) (granting Family
Court jurisdiction over delinquency cases); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2003)
(defining delinquency to refer to cases involving children between age seven and sixteen). Thus,
ratcheting up the severity of a particular crime directly increases the severity of consequences a
sixteen year old or older student faces. Secondly, New York law treats second degree assault as a
"designated felony" in some circumstances. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 301.2(8)(v) (McKinney 2003)
(describing second degree assault committed by 14 and 15 year olds previously found to have
committed such an assault or other specified felonies as "designated felony"). Thus, this law can
lead to more severe dispositional consequences. See N.Y. FAMtLY CT. ACT § 353.5 (McKinney
2003) (describing dispositional procedures for designated felonies).
87. See supra Part III.B.
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siveness of an administrative search." News reports indicate neither fear
is a mere hypothetical. 9
This law may be less important for the issue of school searches-since
evidence of assault is less likely to come from such searches than evi-
dence of drug or gun crimes. Those crimes lead to serious charges in
themselves. Nonetheless, these laws are relevant for two reasons. First,
they amplify the close connections between schools and law enforcement
developed in Parts III.A. and III.B. Second, they increase the policy con-
cern about sparking severe juvenile or criminal court consequences
because ratcheting up the severity of a charge possible after a schoolyard
fight can lead to longer sentences in both juvenile and adult court.' °
Similar laws exist in South Carolina. For instance, South Carolina
penalizes distribution of narcotics in the proximity of a school in a much
harsher manner than other drug dealers.9 In TL.O., the school principal
found marijuana and indications of selling marijuana on school grounds.
Had T.L.O. been of age under state law (and some states classify four-
teen year olds as adults for certain crimes92), South Carolina's statute
would condemn her to double the sentence she could have faced if she
were caught outside of school.
Nationally, thirty-one states have enacted legislation to enforce specific
penalties for crimes at schools.93 The Supreme Court has recognized the
prevalence of state laws making possession of firearms on or near school
grounds a crime. Indeed, the fact that more than forty states had done so
was a key point in two justices' votes to overrule the federal ban on gun
88. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
89. The NEW YORK TIMES reported six arrests of high school students in one day for crimes
no more serious than assault. See supra note 61. Prosecutors charged one student (arrested after
a separate incident) as an adult with second-degree assault after shoving a school security offi-
cer. Michael Brick, Student, 16, Charged as Adult in Assault on School Official, N.Y. T9AEs, Jan.
17, 2004, at B 1. The criminal charge was in addition to a school suspension, during which the
student would attend a "Second Opportunity School," designed to education and provide coun-
seling for students with discipline problems. Id. The assault charge could lead to a seven-year
prison sentence, id., which would of course interfere with whatever counseling the teenager
might get at the alternative school.
90. See supra note 86.
91. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-445 (West 2003) (requiring penalties for selling drugs
within a half-mile of a school of up to ten years in prison, ten-fifteen years if the drug is crack)
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(b)(2) (West 2003) (limiting to five years penalty for distribu-
tion of most controlled substances).
92. See supra note 86.
93. Ronald A. Skinner & Lisa N. Staresina, State of the States, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 8, 2004,
at 114.
July 2004]
312 Journal of Law & Education
possession near schools.' Such laws, coupled with school crime reporting
requirements outlined in Part II.B, nearly ensures that any child caught
with a weapon at school will soon be involved with law enforcement.
This net-widening result is also amplified by the increased presence of
police officers in schools. For example, Toledo, Ohio, passed its Safe
Schools Ordinance in 1968, making it a crime to violate a school rule.
However, few students were charged under the ordinance until 1995,
when Toledo police officers were assigned to secondary schools. The
number of charges increased from 314 in 1993 to 1,727 in 2002.91
D. Probation
One of the most common results for children entering the juvenile
court system is a probation order.96 While choosing such probation
orders means that the child will not go to jail in the short run, violating
orders can lead to contempt charges and more severe punishments,
including confinement of the child.97 To the extent that conditions of
behavior at school are elements of a probation order, increasing the
amount of data released by schools to juvenile courts increases the pos-
sibilities that judges will identify factors that can lead to contempt pro-
ceedings. For instance, if a judge decides to place a juvenile on proba-
tion, a condition of which includes avoiding trouble with school offi-
cials, then a search by a school official-police or otherwise--can lead
to severe legal consequences for the child. This is less of a doctrinal
argument than a policy one. Generally speaking, someone on probation
enjoys less Fourth Amendment protections.98 Regardless of the constitu-
tionality of using school searches to make findings of contempt in pro-
94. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at
Al.
96. The Department of Justice reports that 54% of all adjudicated delinquency cases result
in a probation order. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NAT'L REP. 159 (1999), available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org.
97. See Barry C. Feld, Cases and Materials on Juvenile Justice Administration 876 (2000)
(concluding that "most [states] have affirmed their juvenile courts' use of the comtempt power to
order the secure detention of contemptuous status offenders despite an expression of legislative
intent generally banning such detention" and citing cases in Wisconsin, South Carolina,
Washington, Illinois, and Minnesota to this effect). See also id. at 867-79 (describing use of con-
tempt charges to "bootstrap" probation dispositions into further delinquency charges).
98. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upholding state regulation allowing war-
rantless searches without probable cause of probationers' homes).
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bation cases, any policy that increases the potential numbers of contempt
proceedings raises concerns of widening the juvenile court's net.
Similarly, the use of probation-and resulting contempt findings-are
not new phenomena in juvenile or criminal court. However, sharing
increased amounts of information from schools that can lead to findings
of contempt is a new development and will likely result in increasing
numbers of contempt findings in future years.
E. Juvenile Courts Share Confidential Records with School Officials
A further indication of the crumbling borders between schools and law
enforcement comes from widespread state laws calling for juvenile
courts to share confidential records with public school officials, often
leading to school disciplinary penalties.99 Thus, school disciplinary
actions are now contingent on juvenile court decisions. While this trend
is the reverse of this essay's primary concern-this trend involves infor-
mation flowing from courts to schools, not vice versa-it does display
that borders between the two institutions are far from firm. Indeed, some
state laws require schools and law enforcement agencies to cooperate on
such information- sharing."
This trend is present in both New York and South Carolina. New York
state law requires juvenile courts to appoint a school liaison, who will
notify a school official (which school districts are required to appoint) to
share information regarding a student's criminal or delinquency convic-
tion.' 10 South Carolina law requires juvenile courts to notify school prin-
cipals regarding dispositions of all delinquency cases regarding crimes
involving violence, weapons, drug distribution, or certain crimes com-
mitted on school grounds, and the school must maintain this information
in the student's disciplinary record."2
F. Do Increasingly Severe Problems of School Violence and Drug Trade
Indicate the Need for Continued Flexibility?
These trends exist in context, of course: Schools face significant
amounts of crime, often severe violent crime.'03 Effectively addressing
99. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools
and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 577-88 (2004).
100. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11325.9 (West 2003) (requiring interagency col-
laborations in Alameda, San Bernadino, and Ventura Counties in California).
101. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 380.90(1) (Gould 2001).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-8510(E) (West 2003).
103. A recent Department of Education Survey displays some of the extent of school crime.
The department reported that in a given school year, 18% of students nationwide are threatened
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these trends to provide a safe and secure learning environment is
undoubtedly a crucial objective of public school systems; indeed the
development of these trends led directly away from an in loco parentis
theory of public school searches to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. °n
School systems seeking to uphold searches in the absence of probable
cause would cite such needs as justifying searches that would not be pos-
sible outside of school grounds. This argument would cite TL.O. 's dis-
cussion of increasing problems with school discipline, including drug
use and violent crime in schools, to justify the increased need for search-
es at schools." 5
This argument fails for several reasons. First and foremost, it entirely
ignores the Supreme Court's special needs doctrine case law, discussed
in Part I.B above. Relying on this statement in TL.O. implies that the
more schools are beset by crime, the easier it is for schools to search stu-
dents without probable cause. Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates
the contrary-the more the state interest resembles crime control, the
more standard Fourth Amendment requirements such as probable cause
are required. Relatedly, we ought to be wary of turning schools into mini
police-states for the message it sends to our children regarding their
place in society. If we as a society consider school security concerns so
great as to require the developing security apparatus that post-TL.O.
developments represent, then our legal doctrines ought to protect chil-
dren from abuses of this apparatus.
Second, it is not clear that aggressive searches that lead to increased
use of the juvenile justice system will further the schools' interest in
security. Moreover, it might actively harm society's larger interest in
crime prevention. Commentators have recognized that the exchange of
information between juvenile court and schools, combined with increas-
with violence, 11% experienced a robbery or threat of violence with a weapon. PLANNING AND
EVALUATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., WIDE SCOPE, QUESTIONABLE QUALITY: THREE
REPORTS FROM THE STUDY ON SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND PREVENTION, 3 (2001), available at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/school-improvement.html#3-reports (last visited May 31,
2004). The study did not address drug crimes.
104. See Stefkovich & Miller, supra note 13 at 26-28 (describing history of school search
doctrine and school crime leading up to TL. 0., which dismissed the notion of in loco parentis-
which held that school officials acted in parents' place and thus were not state actors for consti-
tutional purposes-and applied the Fourth Amendment to searches by school officials).
105. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (noting that "in recent years,
school disorder has often taking particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools
have become major social problem" and reasoning that enforcement of school rules is especial-
ly necessary).
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ing toughness of delinquency dispositions and school discipline policies
"work together to inhibit rehabilitation and actually increase crime over
time."' A school's decision to share evidence of a crime discovered at
school can have the ultimate school disciplinary effect-expelling the
student from school as the juvenile justice system maintains custody of
the child. Commentators have noted that children so excluded from
school are more likely to "refine patterns of delinquency and assimilate
into a culture of deviance."'' 7
The argument on behalf of allowing school searches without probable
cause would be stronger if such searches were not so closely tied to law
enforcement. If, for instance, a school set a policy of searching students
with reasonable suspicion only but refused to turn evidence gathered in
such searches over to law enforcement, then such a policy would fit
more closely in line with Supreme Court precedent. Schools have a wide
variety of disciplinary options available that do not involve using the
juvenile justice system. T.L.O. herself would not have gotten off free of
consequences had her assistant principal declined to share evidence
from his search with the police: The school suspended her for seven days
for possession of marijuana."8 Vernonia and Earls demonstrate that
school search policies can limit the consequences of such searches to
school discipline, including the provision of rehabilitation services.1°9 A
student found with a loaded gun on school grounds or who repeatedly
engages in violence could be suspended or transferred to a school more
closely tailored to his or her emotional needs. By avoiding the juvenile
justice system, such a result might also serve the school's security inter-
est in the long run."0
106. Henning, supra note, at 524.
107. Id. at 557. See also Amalia E. Cuervo, et al., NAT'L SCH. BD. Assoc., Toward Better
and Safer Schools (1984); Cherry Henault, Zero Tolerance in the Schools, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 547,
550 (2001). Other commentators have correlated schools that adopt zero tolerance policies with
higher rates of delinquency and incarceration among their students. Russell Skiba et. al.,
Consistent Removal: Contributions of School Discipline to the School-Prison Pipeline, 4, avail-
able at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/pipeline03/Skibbav3.pdf (last visited
May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Consistent Removal]. This data both shows the lack of any signifi-
cant boundary between school discipline and criminal justice policies and suggests, though not
conclusively, that zero tolerance policies increase the likelihood that affected students will com-
mit crimes and become incarcerated.
108. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 329 n.1.
109. See supra Part II.B.i.
110. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, schools would not be deprived of their ability to protect
students from actual emergencies. A school or law enforcement official
could still use Terry stops and frisks if they have reasonable suspicion
that a student might have a weapon that poses a danger to the official."'
IV. APPLYING POST-TL.O. DEVELOPMENTS TO SCHOOL
SEARCHES
A. Recent Case Law Fails to Fully Consider the Impact of Increased
Coordination between Schools and Law Enforcement
A sampling of juvenile court cases from several jurisdictions shows
that many courts fail to grasp the importance of increased coordination
between schools and law enforcement. Instead, to determine the appli-
cability of TL.O., courts seek clear but overly formalistic distinctions
based on the level of law enforcement involvement in a particular
search, ignoring policy-wide or programmatic intent and creating a dif-
ficult, fact-specific inquiry for trial courts to apply. This section surveys
and critiques some of these cases.
Several courts have tried to craft distinctions between searches initiat-
ed by police and those initiated by school officials. Most recently, in In
re Ana E.," 2 a New York Family Court judge ruled that T.L.O.'s reason-
able suspicion standard rather than probable cause applied to a search by
a school police officer of a student's backpack performed at the request
of a school principal. The court expressed some concern that the identi-
ty of the person searching the child's bag-a police officer-might
change the applicable standard, but held that any such concern dissipat-
ed because "the school authorities initiated the investigation that led to
the search.""' 3 The court feared than an alternative result would create a
two-tiered system where police officers would be held to a probable
111. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Pinard supra note 13, at 1122 (outlining the
steps of Terry stops and frisks in school).
112. In re Ana E., 2002 WL 264315, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 40018(U) (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 2002).
Earlier cases crafted a similar distinction. See, e.g., In re Alexander B., 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344
n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("Since the search of appellant and his companions was undertaken by
police at the request of a school official, we need not consider the appropriate standard for assess-
ing the legality of searches undertaken by school officials at the behest of police.").
113. Id.
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cause standard and teachers to a reasonable suspicion standard and that
this would encourage teachers to perform searches for dangerous
weapons rather than police officers who are better trained to "neutral-
iz[e] dangerous weapons. '""4
Ana E. errs in its focus on the identity of who searched the student in
question and who initiated the search. While these factors are somewhat
relevant both to the purpose and overall reasonableness of a search,"5
they do not represent the most important factor. In particular, the court's
focus on the individual search failed entirely to consider the purpose of
the overall policy of searches performed in schools involving police offi-
cers. Edmond demands a broader, policy-wide rather than specific-inci-
dent intent analysis."6 Ironically, the New York Family Court implied
that fine distinctions regarding who initiated a particular search may
have little relevance, opining that, regardless of who initiated a search,
"the school safety officers work at the school and are part of the school
community.""' 7 Thus, the Family Court seemed unable to distinguish the
work of the police officer and of school officials. Ana E. would have
been better reasoned had the court followed this point to its logical con-
clusion: When it came to school searches, police officers and school
officials were involved in the same overall enterprise, and the purpose of
that enterprise rather than the identity of searchers or search initiators
would properly identify the standard applicable to the search at issue.
Such an analysis into programmatic purpose would be more consistent
with Edmond and eliminate the court's concern about creating a two-
tiered system differentiating between teachers and police officers, as
well as the doctrinal difficulty of distinguishing police and school-initi-
ated searches on a case-by-case basis."8
114. Id. The New York Family Court relied on a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion, In the
Interest ofAngelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997). For another court that relied on the dis-
tinction between a search performed by a school official and a police officer and the difficulty of
making such distinctions in some cases, see In re Murray, 525 S.E.2d 496, 498 (N.C. App. 2000)
(determining that when police officer wrestled bag away from handcuffed child then handed bag to
teacher to search, "the search of Murray's book bag was conducted by a school official" and thus
TL.O. applied). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court implied it would follow a two-tiered
approach, applying reasonable suspicion to searches by school officials and probable cause to
searches by police officers. Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199, 1203 n.4 (Mass. 1990).
115. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
117. In re Ana E., 2002 WL 264315, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 40018(U) (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002).
118. For an example of a case showing the difficulty in distinguishing such cases, see supra
note 114 (discussing In re Murray).
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Illinois courts have gone a step beyond Ana E. and applied a reason-
able suspicion standard to searches performed by school police officers
even when initiated by the police officer. While this holding avoids the
two-tiered difficulty addressed by the Ana E. court, it is similarly flawed
in its failure to address the programmatic purpose of school searches.
The Illinois Supreme Court stated its conclusion in People v. Dilworth as
applying the reasonable suspicion standard when the case "involv[es] a
liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and
authority, in furtherance of the school's attempt to maintain a proper
educational environment."' 9 Thus, the court focused on whether the par-
ticular search was motivated by the school's interest in a "proper educa-
tional environment." This analysis suffers from several flaws. First, it
ignores broader systemic factors indicative of programmatic intent. The
police officer's presence inextricably mixed educational and law
enforcement purposes: He had power to both assign detentions and to
arrest students'20 and, by school policy announced in the student hand-
book, any illegal items found in any search lead to law enforcement
involvement.'2 ' Second, the court's broad statement of the school's non-
law enforcement purpose allows significant room for prosecutors to spin
a particular search as motivated by a desire for a safe learning environ-
ment; eliciting such testimony from the police officer in question likely
is easy for a seasoned prosecutor to do.
A lower Illinois court extended Dilworth a short time later, holding
that even though a police officer's primary purpose for being stationed
at school was to prevent criminal activity, searches he performed trig-
gered a reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause analysis.'22 The
court's conclusion is flawed on two grounds. First, it presumes that the
searcher's identity as a police office made the special needs analysis no
119. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996). This case was an adult narcotics
prosecution of a student found by a school police officer with drugs hidden in a flashlight. Id. at
313.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 314. An additional problem in Dilworth's analysis came from its use of Vernonia.
While it cited that case, it failed to mention that the drug tests at issue there formed part of a pol-
icy that specifically excluded law enforcement involvement, while the search here explicitly
required it. Id. at 318.
122. People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540, 544 (I11. App. 1996).
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different than if a school official performed the search. '23 Second, and
more shocking, the court acknowledged a law enforcement concern as
the officer's "primary purpose" yet failed to recognize the implications
of such a purpose for the application of the special needs doctrine.'
24
Courts' focus on who initiated a search and the level of police involve-
ment has led commentators reviewing school search case law to list all
the various permutations of how police and school official interaction
could lead to a search. Jacqueline Stefkovich and Judith Miller listed
seven such possibilities, involving various means of initiation and levels
of involvement by police and school officials.'
25 Reviewing case law,2 6
they conclude that the "standard for police-related searches in schools
will be determined by who is the agent of the search."'27 This approach
is unfortunate, and rightly criticized. As the Ana E. court noted, this two-
tiered approach would create perverse incentives for school-police inter-
123. Recent Supreme Court cases have emphasized that law enforcement identity of the
searcher is of great importance. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001)
(distinguishing Charleston's maternal drug testing from previous cases due to its "use of law
enforcement"); id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("None of our special needs precedents has sanc-
tioned the routine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the deign of the policy and in using arrests,
either threatened or real, to implement the system designed for the special needs objectives.").
124. Pruitt involved three cases, each relating to a school search by a city police officer who
discovered firearms on defendants' persons or in their bookbags. The state could conceivably
argue that the indisputably compelling need to prevent gun violence at schools made the primary
purpose of preventing such gun crimes fall under the "health and safety" rationale. However, the
reality that these cases immediately turned into criminal charges against the students involved-
not simply school disciplinary actions more closely tailored to the interest of school safety-indi-
cates preventing and punishing crime are indistinguishable in this case. In Pruitt, a Chicago
police officer found a handgun on the defendant after he set off a metal detector, a discovery that
immediately led to the defendant's arrest. 662 N.E.2d at 544. ("After the gun was discovered,
Officer Sonne escorted Pruitt to a conference room where essay work regarding Pruitt's arrest
was completed" and noting that such arrest was official school policy according to a school hand-
book entered into evidence). In a severe legal error, the court failed to consider this policy-and
the explicit law enforcement purpose of arresting juveniles with firearms-when analyzing the
search. Accordingly, the primary purpose must also refer to the ordinary law enforcement pur-
pose of charging and punishing individuals for gun crimes, ending any opportunity to use the
special needs doctrine. In an additional error, the court cited Vernonia for support without noting
that the drug tests at issue there had no connection to law enforcement. Id. at 547.
125. Stefkovich & Miller, supra note 13 at 33. For an alternative list of six categories, see
Pinard supra note 13, at 1083-90.
126. Stefkovch & Miller's discussion of six school search cases may be found in id. at 45-
53.
127. Id. at 40. See also id. at 45 ("The more that police and security guards are involved in
the investigation leading up to the search, in the decision to search, and in the actual search, the
more likely the court will enforce the stricter probable cause standard.").
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action: Police would have incentives to use school officials to perform
searches when probable cause does not exist.128 Additionally, such a stan-
dard will burden our already overburdened juvenile courts with difficult,
case-specific decisions and would provide little guidance to school dis-
tricts determining whether or how to collaborate with law enforcement.
A premise of TL. 0. was the Court's desire to not require school officials
to become legal experts, 29 but the standards summarized by Stefkovich
and Miller would require enough legal knowledge to evaluate tests
applied to each variation of school-police interactions. More fundamen-
tally, focusing on the relative significance of a police officer's involve-
ment in a particular search fails to account for the cooperation, interde-
pendence and inseparability of law enforcement and school officials.
B. Applying the Administrative Search Test in Light of Post-TL.O.
Developments
The above sampling of cases displays the need for a more rigorous
appraisal of TL.O.'s continued viability. A better approach would ask
whether a given school or school district's policies and programs are so
entangled with law enforcement as to make TL.O. inapplicable, 3' thus
applying one standard-reasonable suspicion or probable cause-to all
searches within each school. Applying tests from administrative search
cases discussed in Part II to developments in school-law enforcement
interdependence discussed in Part III, this section provides a fuller
analysis of post-TL. 0. school searches. It lays out two arguments, either
of which could be adopted by state or federal courts. First, a strong case
exists that courts should no longer consider many school searches under
the special needs framework because their purpose is now too closely
aligned with general law enforcement goals. Second, even if school
128. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. See also Pinard supra note 13, at 1092
("These different standards encourage law enforcement officers to persuade school officials to
conduct searches on their behalf when the level of suspicion does not rise to probable cause, rely-
ing on the lower reasonableness standard as a bootstrap.").
129. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130. This test differs from Pinard's proposal. His test would ask whether "the purpose of
their [police or school officials'] searches is to uncover evidence of criminal activity." Pinard,
supra note 13. at 1119. This requires a case-by-case analysis of the intent behind any search at
issue, a difficult task for trial courts and a test that provides little guidance to school policy mak-
ers. More fundamentally, it ignores Edmond and Ferguson's instructions to focus on the policy-
wide or programmatic intent, rather than the individual officer's intent. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
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searches may still be considered administrative searches, increased
school-law enforcement cooperation increases the level of intrusiveness
that they cause and thus add to the set of factors weighing on the side of
defendants' case that such searches are unreasonable.
1. Prong One: Are school searches special needs administrative searches or
general law enforcement searches?
Developments discussed in Part III indicate that, at the very least,
school-law enforcement cooperation has blended the purposes of general
law enforcement and maintaining a safe school environment. This con-
clusion is particularly strong when one considers the Stratford High
School raid. The raid was performed by police officers, raising an issue
that TL.O. did not address."' Cases like Ana E. that distinguish searches
initiated by school officials from those initiated by police'32 would
nonetheless apply T.L.0.'s framework, because the police only became
involved after contacts from school officials. However, such an analysis
would ignore other developments that raise questions about the applica-
bility of TL.O. Police officers are permanently stationed in Stratford
High School and, along with security cameras, keep close watch for any
illegal activity by students.'33 Whenever "notice" of such activity exists,
those police officers are directly involved or, as with the raid in question,
school officials are obligated by state law and school district policy under
threat of civil liability to report suspicions to the police.' Expanding
criminalization of activity at school and broad lists of crimes under
school policy ensures that school officials will have no shortage of crimes
to support.'35 These contacts are reciprocated by juvenile court ties to
schools, and contacts in both directions have significant effects on chil-
dren in both institutions. 36 The sum of all these contacts is that efforts to
maintain a safe learning environment are indistinguishable from general
law enforcement efforts. Those law enforcement aims-measured as a
matter of policy-wide intent'37 and routine practice' 38 -should prevent
131. See supra note 17.
132. See supra Part IVA.
133. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part III.B.
135. See supra Part III.C.
136. See supra Parts III.D and III.E.
137. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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any court from applying TL.O. to the Stratford High School raid. More
broadly, it should also prevent any court from applying TL.O. to any
school search performed in the shadow of such close routine program-
matic ties between schools and law enforcement. Prosecutors would no
doubt couch such routine programmatic ties as serving the interests of
safe and orderly educational environments, but it seems farcical to dis-
tinguish those purposes from general law enforcement purposes once law
enforcement is pervasively entangled 39 with schools.
School officials could still take advantage of the reasonable suspicion
standard of TL.O. if they search students outside of any policy mandat-
ing that the official turn over any incriminating evidence to law
enforcement. Distinguishing such a case from situations where TL.O. is
not applicable primarily relates to the intent of a school district's pro-
gram or policy and should not require a difficult investigation of the
intent of a particular school official in a specific incident.
2. Prong Two: If T.L.O. Applies, are the Searches Reasonable-Do Policies
Balance the Special Needs with the Intrusion Involved?
Even if a court fails to recognize the general law enforcement purpos-
es of many school searches, applying the TL.O. test requires considera-
tion of the details of any particular search. It is no stretch to call the
Stratford High School raid-involving drawn guns and forcing students
to lie down on the hallway floor as police search their bags-unreason-
able.4 ° However, the broad connections between schools and law
enforcement increase the intrusion of any particular search: Searches are
more likely to be performed by police officers or with cooperation of
police agencies and are more likely to result in a deprivation of freedom.
Courts should analyze these factors to determine the reasonableness of
any school search. 4'
Other factors-which will necessarily vary from school to school-
raise policy concerns regarding developing school-law enforcement
139. Ferguson v. City of Charleston used the "excessive entanglement" language while void-
ing a search the state tried to justify on a special needs ground. See supra note 34 and accompa-
nying text.
140. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
141. Earls identified three key criteria that affect the reasonableness analysis: the privacy
interest at stake, Earls, 536 U.S. 830, the "character of the intrusion," id. at 832, and "the nature
and immediacy of the government's concerns." Id. at 834. The severity of consequences that now
flow from school searches as a matter of routine and policy relate to the first two factors.
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cooperation. Chief among these factors is a concern for racially dis-
parate effect of particular policies; the closer school-law enforcement
ties discussed in this essay are more prevalent in low-income and pre-
dominantly minority schools. The Department of Education has report-
ed that schools with higher populations of minority students are more
likely to have a significant police presence. 14 2 Thus, a higher proportion
of minority students are likely to be faced with such searches that carry
with them the added risk of leading to a juvenile court appearance.
Commentators have also noted how police school interactions dispro-
portionately burden African-American and Latino students.'43
Discriminatory enforcement by schools and police could exacerbate
this unequal impact. In the South Carolina case, the raid's tactics led to
a disparate impact; police initiated the raid immediately after two buses
filled largely with African-American children arrived at school.'" This
resulted in a hugely disproportionate burden of the searches falling on
African-American students: While less than a quarter of Stratford High
school students are African-American, two-thirds of students in the hall-
way during the raid were African-American.' 5 While the South Carolina
case may present an extreme example of police behavior, the racially
discriminatory enforcement is nothing new to the juvenile justice con-
text. Studies indicate that African-American youth are overrepresented
at every stage of the juvenile justice process'"
142. See Planning and Evaluation Service, U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 66, at i-ii (report-
ing that the most violent high schools "tended to be located in urban areas and have a high per-
centage of minority students" and these schools "were more likely to use" law enforcement per-
sonnel than schools with lower crime rates).
143. See Pinard, supra note 13, at 1113-16 (describing disparate impact of school discipline
policies).
144. See Lewin, supra note 68 ("The timing of the raid, which began at 6:45 a.m., appar-
ently contributed to the racial skew: only the earliest buses, filled mostly with black students, had
delivered their passengers .... "). The racially disparate impact has "opened a racial chasm in the
school," with rallies attended mostly by African-American community members calling for the
principal's firing. Id. Nineteen of the twenty plaintiffs in the ACLU lawsuit are African-
American, according to the ACLU's complaint, available at http://www.aclu.org/
DrugPolicy/DrugPolicy.cfm?ID=14576&c=19 (last visited May 30, 2004).
145. Id.
146. African-American youth are twice as likely as whites to be referred to juvenile court
and more likely to be detained once involved in the juvenile court. OFF. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999
NAT'L REP. 150, 154 (1999).
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This concern also speaks to overall net-widening concerns from
increased school-law enforcement connections.'47 "Net-widening" refers
to practices that "extend the social control function of the juvenile court
to youngsters who otherwise would not have been involved in the juve-
nile justice system."'48 Commentators typically criticize such practices
for leading to unnecessary state intervention in the lives of children and
families.'49 This belief is informed by a general belief that the juvenile
justice system is unlikely to provide positive intervention, even for chil-
dren whose behavior indicates that some sort of intervention is decided-
ly necessary because such intervention interferes with counseling and
related services available outside of the criminal justice system. The
proper scope of the juvenile court's intervention is a topic well beyond
the scope of this essay. However, the notion that the juvenile court's fail-
ures ought to lead courts to hesitate before allowing net-widening poli-
cies should not be controversial; even courts opposed to children's rights
understand that their decisions will increase involvement with the juve-
nile justice system and have worried about this result.5
It seems likely that school discipline policies will increase the fre-
quency with which students are found delinquent or convicted of adult
crimes.'5' Indeed, academics and policy advocates consider this result so
striking that conferences on the "school to prison pipeline" are now com-
147. For an example of how policies discussed in this essay have actually widened the net
of one city's juvenile court, see the statistics noted in the text accompanying note 95.
148. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does not Roll
Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 543 (1998).
149. See, e.g., id. ("Net-widening was roundly criticized as reduc[ing] individual freedom,
increas[ing] the number of rearrests, contribut[ing] to the behavioral difficulties [of youths], and
facilitat[ing] unnecessary intrusions into families.") (quotations and citations omitted).
150. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971)
(We must recognize... that the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents
... have not been realized.... Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stal-
wart, protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged. The community's
unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency of time
devoted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and
our general lack of knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment.).
151. See Skiba et al., supra note 107, at 16 (reporting high correlation between tougher
school discipline policies and relatively high rates of delinquency findings and adult criminal
convictions).
152. See, e.g., HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE CONFERENCE:
CHARTING INTERVENTION STRATEGIES OF PREVENTION AND SUPPORT FOR MINORITY CHILDREN, May
15-16, 2003, at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/convenings/schooltoprison/
synopsis.php (last visited May 31, 2004). This conference focused on issues broader than that of
this essay. In particular, many presentations discussed the links between tougher school discipline
and later criminal acts.
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monplace.' 52 Even a cursory glance at policies governing Stratford High
School illustrates how "the placement of law enforcement personnel in
public schools has contributed to the increased use of the juvenile and
criminal justice systems to handle problems and issues that had once been
resolved through school disciplinary processes."'53 Under a school district
policy enacted to conform with the state's School Crime Report Act, the
school must report evidence of crimes as minor as assault to law enforce-
ment agencies.'54 Accordingly, as a matter of school policy, nearly any
schoolyard fight leads to a police investigation and a delinquency pro-
ceeding. The same is true for possession of a small amount of marijuana.
V. CONCLUSION
A crucial pillar of TL.O. has not fared well in the nearly twenty years
since that decision. It is no longer tenable to envision schools as sepa-
rated by firm gates from the outside world. Whatever the implications of
this insight in other contexts, it should force schools to consider the
implications of pervasively entangling themselves with law enforcement
and it should force courts to reevaluate the applicability of TL.O. in an
era of close cooperation between schools and law enforcement. This
reevaluation requires analysis of all forms of programmatic and routine
ties between schools and law enforcement. More fundamentally, such
analysis is predicated on the recognition that subjecting schoolchildren
to regular law enforcement supervision and searches requires attaching
the same protections from police abuses that adults enjoy. Refusing to
reevaluate TL.O. would leave us with the doctrinally-flawed decisions
discussed in Part IV.A. More disturbingly, it would allow school systems
and law enforcement agencies to continue sending children a poor mes-
sage: We will subject you to a police state at school because you are chil-
dren without rights, then we will subject you to severely-punitive, adult-
like consequences for any infraction. Courts have the power to send chil-
dren a better message, and lawyers for children ought to raise issues pre-
sented in this essay until they do so.
153. Pinard supra note 13, at 1069.
154. See supra note 82.
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